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Abstract
In recent years several adversarial attacks and defenses have been proposed.
Often seemingly robust models turn out to be non-robust when more sophisti-
cated attacks are used. One way out of this dilemma are provable robustness
guarantees. While provably robust models for specific lp-perturbation mod-
els have been developed, they are still vulnerable to other lq-perturbations.
We propose a new regularization scheme, MMR-Universal, for ReLU net-
works which enforces robustness wrt l1- and l∞-perturbations and show how
that leads to provably robust models wrt any lp-norm for p ≥ 1.
1 Introduction
The vulnerability of neural networks against adversarial manipulations [30, 11] is a problem
for their deployment in safety critical applications such as autonomous driving and medical
diagnosis systems. In fact, small perturbations of the input which appear irrelevant or
even imperceivable to humans are able to change the decisions of neural networks. Thus
these networks are too some extent considered unreliable and can be the subject of active
adversarial attacks. Moreover, the phenomenon of adversarial examples is a problem regarding
explainability as the entire decision making process is revealed to be quite fragile.
In order to mitigate the non robustness of neural networks many defenses have been proposed
[13, 38, 25, 16, 3, 22], but at the same time more sophisticated attacks have been developed
to prove those defenses ineffective [5, 2, 24]. The only widely accepted defense strategy
which appears to improve the resistance of classifiers, at least wrt l∞-bounded attacks, is the
adversarial training of [22]. However, it has been shown that these l∞-adversarially trained
models are not more robust than normal models when attacked with perturbations of small
lp-norms other than l∞ [28, 27, 8, 17]. A potential remedy is the very recent extension of
adversarial training wrt multiple lp-norms [32]. However, there is still a lack in understanding
how the different lp-attack models interact. The situation becomes even more complicated if
one extends the attack models beyond lp-balls to other sets of perturbations not changing
too much the semantic content [4, 9, 15, 10].
A solution which at least solves the potential problem of overestimating the actual robustness
of a model are provable robustness guarantees. This means that it can be certified that
the decision of the network does not change in a certain lp-ball around the target point.
Along this line, current state-of-the-art methods compute either the exact robustness at
each input point [18, 31], that is the norm of the smallest perturbation which modifies the
classification, or lower bounds [14, 26, 34, 33] on it. At the same time several new training
schemes [14, 26, 34, 23, 6, 37, 12] aim at both enhancing the robustness of networks and
producing models more amenable to verification techniques. However, all of them are only
able to prove robustness against a single kind of perturbation, typically either l2 or l∞, but
not wrt all the lp-norms. The only two papers which have shown empirical robustness against
multiple types of adversarial examples are [27, 32], which resist against l0- resp. l1-, l2- and
ar
X
iv
:1
90
5.
11
21
3v
1 
 [c
s.L
G]
  2
7 M
ay
 20
19
l∞-attacks. However, they cannot provide provable guarantees on the robustness and the
technique proposed in [27] is restricted to MNIST.
In this paper we propose a regularizer which allows to train models which are simultaneously
provably robust to all the lp-norms with p ∈ [1,∞]. Our approach extends [6] where the
piecewise affine nature of the functions a ReLU network can model has been used to motivate
a regularizer pushing away the locally linear decision boundary as well as the boundary of
the linear region to achieve lp-robustness. We show in this paper that having guarantees
on the l1- and l∞-distance to the decision boundary and region boundaries is sufficient to
achieve simultaneous robustness wrt all lp-norms for p ≥ 1. In particular, we show that
our guarantees are independent of the dimension and thus go beyond a naive approach
where one just exploits that all lp-metrics can be upper- and lower-bounded wrt any other
lq-metric. Then, we extend the regularizer introduced in [6] so that we can directly maximize
these bounds at training time. Finally, we show the effectiveness of our technique with
experiments on four datasets, where the networks trained with our technique have non-trivial
provable robustness wrt l1-, l2- and l∞-perturbations which so far could not be achieved
simultaneously.
2 Local properties and robustness guarantees of ReLU networks
It is well known that feedforward neural networks (fully connected, CNNs, residual networks,
dense-nets etc.) with piecewise affine activation functions, e.g. ReLU, leaky ReLU, yield
continuous piecewise affine functions [1, 7]. In [6] they exploit this property to derive bounds
on the robustness of these networks against adversarial manipulations. In the following we
recall the main results of [6] which are the basis of our approach.
2.1 ReLU networks as piecewise affine functions
Definition 2.1 A function f : Rd → R is called piecewise affine if there exists a finite set
of polytopes {Qr}Mr=1 (referred to as linear regions of f) such that ∪Mr=1Qr = Rd and f is an
affine function when restricted to every Qr.
Let f : Rd → RK be a classifier with d being the dimension of the input space and K the
number of classes. The classifier decision at a point x is given by arg max
r=1,...,K
fr(x). Denoting
the activation function as σ (σ(t) = max{0, t} if ReLU is used) and assuming L hidden
layers, we have
g(l)(x) = W (l)f (l−1)(x) + b(l), f (l)(x) = σ(g(l)(x)), l = 1, . . . , L,
with f (0)(x) ≡ x and f(x) = W (L+1)f (L)(x) + b(L+1) is the output of f . Moreover, W (l) ∈
Rnl×nl−1 and b(l) ∈ Rnl , where nl is the number of units in the l-th layer (n0 = d, nL+1 = K).
In [6] is shown that each component of f is a piecewise affine function and that, given a point
x ∈ Rd, it is possible to compute V (l) ∈ Rnl×d and v(l) ∈ Rnl , for every l = 1, . . . , L + 1,
such that
g(l)(y) ≡ V (l)y + v(l), f(y) ≡ V (L+1)y + v(L+1), ∀y ∈ Q(x), (1)
where, defining δlj = sign(g(l)j (x)) and Vj the j-th row of V ,
Q(x) = {z ∈ Rd ∣∣ δlj(V (l)j z + v(l)j ) ≥ 0, l = 1, . . . , L, j = 1, . . . , nl}. (2)
This means that Q(x) is the polytope containing x inside which f is an affine function,
explicitly represented by V (L+1) and v(L+1).
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Let q be defined via 1p +
1
q = 1, then we introduce the two quantities
dBp (x) = min
l=1,...,L
min
j=1,...,nl
∣∣ 〈V (l)j , x〉+ v(l)j ∣∣∥∥∥V (l)j ∥∥∥
q
,
dDp (x) = min
s=1,...,K
s6=c
〈
V
(L+1)
c − V (L+1)s , x
〉
+ v(L+1)c − v(L+1)s∥∥∥V (L+1)c − V (L+1)s ∥∥∥
q
,
(3)
where dBp (x) is the minimal lp-distance of x to the border of the polytope Q(x), while |dDp (x)|
that to the closest decision surface (hyperplane) if |dDp (x)| ≤ dBp (x). Notice that dDp (x) < 0
in case x is misclassified and that this quantity corresponds to d¯D(x) in [6].
2.2 Robustness guarantees inside linear regions
The p-robustness rp(x) of a classifier f at a point x, belonging to class c, wrt the lp-norm is
defined as the optimal value of the following optimization problem
rp(x) = min
δ∈Rd
‖δ‖p , s.th. max
l 6=c
fl(x+ δ) ≥ fc(x+ δ), x+ δ ∈ S, (4)
where is S a set of constraints on the input, e.g. pixel values of images have to be in [0, 1].
The p-robustness rp(x) is the smallest lp-distance to x of a point which is classified differently
than c. Thus, rp(x) = 0 for misclassified points. The following theorem from [6] modified to
fit the definition of rp(x) provides guarantees on rp(x).
Theorem 2.1 ([6]) If dBp (x) < dDp (x), then rp(x) ≥ dBp (x), while if |dDp (x)| ≤ dBp (x), then
rp(x) = max{dDp (x), 0}.
Although Theorem 2.1 holds for any lp-norm, it requires to compute dBp (x) and dDp (x) for
every p individually. In this paper we show that it is possible to derive bounds on the
robustness rp(x) for any p ∈ (1,∞) using only the knowledge of r1(x) and r∞(x). This
allows us to introduce a new training scheme which is able to enhance the provable robustness
of the classifiers wrt every lp-norm at the same time by enforcing simultaneous robustness
wrt l1- and l∞-norm. While the straightforward usage of standard lp-norm inequalities does
not yield powerful guarantees wrt the union of l1- and l∞ ball, we show that in the context
of piecewise linear classifiers one obtains a guarantee with respect to the convex hull of l1-
and l∞-ball which is significantly stronger.
3 Minimal lp-norm of the complement of the union of l1- and
l∞-ball and its convex hull
Let B1 = {x ∈ Rd : ‖x‖1 ≤ 1} and B∞ = {x ∈ Rd : ‖x‖∞ ≤ ∞} be the l1-ball of radius
1 > 0 and the l∞-ball of radius ∞ > 0 respectively, both centered at the origin in Rd.
Suppose we can guarantee that the classifier does not change its label in U1,∞ = B1 ∪B∞.
Which guarantee does that imply for all intermediate lp-norms? This question can be simply
answered by computing the minimal norm
minx∈Rd\U1,∞ ‖x‖p .
By the standard norm inequalities it holds, for any x ∈ Rd,
‖x‖p ≥ ‖x‖∞ and ‖x‖p ≥ ‖x‖1 d
1−p
p ,
and thus a naive application of these inequalities yields the bound
min
x∈Rd\U1,∞
‖x‖p ≥ max
{
∞, 1d
1−p
p
}
. (5)
However, this naive bound does not take into account that we know that ‖x‖1 ≥ 1 and‖x‖∞ ≥ ∞. Our first result yields the exact value taking into account this information.
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Figure 1: Visualization of the l2-ball contained in the union resp. the convex hull of the union of l1- and l∞-balls
in R2 (top row) and R3 (bottom row) cases. First column: co-centric l1-ball (blue) and l∞-ball (black). Second:
in red the largest l2-ball completely contained in the union of l1- and l∞-ball. Third: in green the convex hull
of the union of the l1- and l∞-ball. Fourth: the largest l2-ball (red) contained in the convex hull. The l2-ball
contained in the convex hull is significantly larger than that contained in the union of l1- and l∞-ball.
Proposition 3.1 Let d ≥ 2 and define B1 = {x ∈ Rd : ‖x‖1 ≤ 1} and B∞ = {x ∈ Rd :‖x‖∞ ≤ ∞}. Then
min
x∈Rd\(B1∪B∞)
‖x‖p =

∞ if 1 < ∞,(
p∞ +
(1−∞)p
(d−1)p−1
) 1
p if 1 ∈ (∞, d∞),
1d
1−p
p if 1 > d∞
. (6)
Proof. We first note that for 1 < ∞ it holds B1 ⊂ B∞ and the proof follows from the
standard inequality ‖x‖p ≥ ‖x‖∞ where equality is attained for x = ∞ei, where ei are
standard basis vectors. Moreover, if 1 > d∞ it holds B∞ ⊂ B1 as maxx∈B∞ ‖x‖1 = d∞
and the result follows by ‖x‖p ≥ ‖x‖1 d
1−p
p . The equality is realized by the vector with all
the entries equal to 1d .
For the second case we first note that using Hölder inequality | 〈u, v〉 | ≤ ‖u‖p ‖v‖q where
1
p +
1
q = 1, it holds
k∑
i=1
|xi| ≤
( k∑
i=1
|xi|p
) 1
p
k
1
q .
Let x ∈ Rd. Without loss of generality after a potential permutation of the coordinates it
holds |xd| = ‖x‖∞. Then we get
‖x‖pp =
d∑
i=1
|xi|p = |xd|p +
d−1∑
i=1
|xi|p ≥ |xd|p +
(∑d−1
i=1 |xi|
)p
(d− 1) pq
.
We have
min
‖x‖∞≥∞,‖x‖1≥1
|xd|p +
(∑d−1
i=1 |xi|
)p
(d− 1) pq
= p∞ +
(1 − ∞)p
(d− 1)p−1 ,
noting that |xd| = ‖x‖∞ and
∑d−1
i=1 |xi| ≥ 1 − ∞.
Finally, we note that the vector
v =
d−1∑
i=1
1 − ∞
d− 1 ei + ∞ed,
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realizes equality. Indeed, ‖v‖pp = (d− 1) (1−∞)
p
(d−1)p + p∞, which finishes the proof. 
Thus a guarantee both for l1- and l∞-ball yields a guarantee for all intermediate lp-norms.
A first message of this paper is that enforcing provable robustness wrt l1- and l∞-norm
is sufficient to yield provable robustness wrt all lp-norms and our bound gives an exact
expression for this guarantee in terms of the achieved guarantees 1 and ∞.
However, for linear classifiers we can think one step further. Once we have a guarantee for B1
and B∞ then our actual guarantee is wrt the convex hull C of their union B1 ∪B∞ and not
just their union. This can be seen by the fact that a linear classifier generates basically two
half-spaces and the convex hull C of a set A is the intersection of all half-spaces containing
A (see the first and third columns of Figure 1 for an illustration of B1, B∞, their union
and their convex hull). This implies that inside C the decision of the linear classifier cannot
change if it is guaranteed not to change in B1 and B∞. The following theorem characterizes,
for any p ≥ 1, the minimal lp-norm over Rd \ C.
Theorem 3.1 Let d ≥ 2 and C be the convex hull of B1 ∪B∞ with B1 = {x ∈ Rd : ‖x‖1 ≤
1}, B∞ = {x ∈ Rd : ‖x‖∞ ≤ ∞}. If 1 ∈ (∞, d∞), then, for every p ∈ (1,∞),
min
x∈Rd\C
‖x‖p =
1
(1/∞ − α+ αq)1/q
, (7)
where α = 1∞ − b 1∞ c and 1p + 1q = 1.
Proof. We first note that the minimum of the lp-norm over Rd \C lies on the boundary of C
(otherwise any point on the segment joining the origin and y and outside C would have
lp-norm smaller than y). Moreover, the faces of C are contained in hyperplanes constructed
as the affine hull of a subset of d points from the union of the vertices of B1 and B∞.
The vertices of B1 are V1 = {1ei,−1ei | i = 1, . . . , d}, where ei is the i-th element of the
standard basis of Rd, and that of B∞ are V∞, consisting of the 2d vectors whose components
are elements of {∞,−∞}. Note that V1 ∩ V∞ = ∅. Any subset of d vertices from V1 ∪ V∞
defines a hyperplane which contains a face of C if it does not contain any point of the
interior of C.
Let S be a set of vertices defining a hyperplane containing a face of C. We first
derive conditions on the vertices contained in S. Let k =
⌊
1
∞
⌋
∈ N and α = 1∞ − k ∈ [0, 1).
Note that k + 1 > 1∞ . Then no more than k vertices of B1 belong to S, that is to a face of
C. In fact, if we consider k + 1 vertices of B1, namely wlog {1e1, . . . , 1ek+1}, and consider
their convex combination z = 1
∑k+1
i=1
1
k+1ei then ‖z‖∞ = 1k+1 < ∞ by the definition of k.
Thus S cannot contain more than k vertices of B1.
Second, assume 1ej is in S. If any vertex v of B∞ with vj = −∞ is also in S
then, with α′ = ∞1+∞ ∈ (0, 1), we get
‖α′1ej + (1− α′)v‖∞ = max{|α′1 − (1− α′)∞|, (1− α′)∞},
where (1− α′)∞ < ∞ and
|α′1 − (1− α′)∞| = |α′(1 + ∞)− ∞| = 0 < ∞.
Thus S would not span a face as a convex combination intersects the interior of C. This
implies that if 1ej is in S then all the vertices v of B∞ in S need to have vj = ∞, otherwise
S would not define a face of C. Analogously, if −1ej ∈ S then any vertex v of B∞ in S has
vj = −∞. However, we note that out of symmetry reasons we can just consider faces of
C in the positive orthant and thus we consider in the following just sets S which contain
vertices of “positive type” 1ej .
Let now S be a set (not necessarily defining a face of C) containing h ≤ k vertices
of B1 and d − h vertices of B∞ and P the matrix whose columns are these points. The
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matrix P has the form
P =

1 0 . . . 0 ∞ . . . ∞
0 1 . . . 0 ∞ . . . ∞
. . .
0 . . . 0 1 ∞ . . . ∞
0 . . . 0
. . . A
0 . . . 0

where A ∈ Rd−h,d−h is a matrix whose entries are either ∞ or −∞. If the matrix P does
not have full rank then the origin belongs to any hyperplane containing S, which means it
cannot be a face of C. This also implies A has full rank if S spans a face of C.
We denote by pi the hyperplane generated by the affine hull of S (the columns of
P ) assuming that A has full rank. Every point b belonging to the hyperplane pi generated
by S is such that there exists a unique a ∈ Rd which satisfies
P ′a =
(
11,d
P
)
a =

1 . . . 1
1 0 . . . 0 ∞ . . . ∞
0 1 . . . 0 ∞ . . . ∞
. . .
0 . . . 0 1 ∞ . . . ∞
0 . . . 0
. . . A
0 . . . 0

a =
(
1
b
)
= b′,
where 1d1,d2 is the matrix of size d1 × d2 whose entries are 1.
The matrix (P ′, b′) ∈ Rd+1,d+1 need not have full rank, so that
rankP ′ = rank(P ′, b′) = dim a = d
and then the linear system P ′a = b′ has a unique solution.
We define the vector v ∈ Rd as solution of PT v = 1d,1, which is unique as P has full rank.
From their definitions we have Pa = b and 1Ta = 1, so that
1 = 1Ta = (PT v)Ta = vTPa = vT b,
and thus
〈b, v〉 = 1, (8)
noticing that this also implies that any vector b ∈ Rd such that 〈b, v〉 = 1 belongs to pi
(suppose that ∃q /∈ pi with 〈q, v〉 = 1, then define c as the solution of Pc = q and then
1 = 〈q, v〉 = 〈Pc, v〉 = 〈c, PT v〉 = 〈c,1〉 which contradicts that q /∈ pi).
Applying Hölder inequality to (8) we get for any b ∈ pi,
‖b‖p ≥
1
‖v‖q
, (9)
where 1p +
1
q = 1. Moreover, as p ∈ (1,∞) there exists always a point b∗ for which (9) holds
as equality.
In the rest of the proof we compute ‖v‖q for any q > 1 when S is a face of C and then (9)
yields the desired minimal value of ‖b‖p over all b lying in faces of C.
Let v = (v1, v2), v1 ∈ Rh, v2 ∈ Rd−h and Ih denotes the identity matrix of Rh,h.
It holds
PT v =
(
1Ih 0
∞1d−h,h AT
)(
v1
v2
)
=
(
1h,1
1d−h,1
)
= 1d,1,
which implies
v1 =
(
1
1
, . . . ,
1
1
)
and AT v2 = 1d−h,1 − h∞
1
1d−h,1 =
(
1− h∞
1
)
1d−h,1.
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Moreover, we have
‖v‖1 = ‖v1‖1 + ‖v2‖1 =
h
1
+ ‖v2‖1 , ‖v‖∞ = max
{
1
1
, ‖v2‖∞
}
. (10)
If S generates a face, then by definition pi does not intersect with the interior of C and thus
it holds for all b ∈ pi: ‖b‖1 ≥ 1 and ‖b‖∞ ≥ ∞. Suppose ‖v‖1 = c > 1∞ . Then there exists
b∗ ∈ pi such equality in Hölder’s equality is realized, that is 1 = 〈b∗, v〉 = ‖b∗‖∞ ‖v‖1, and
thus ‖b∗‖∞ = 1c < ∞, which contradicts ‖b‖∞ ≥ ∞ for all b ∈ pi and thus it must hold
‖v‖1 ≤ 1∞ . Similarly, one can derive ‖v‖∞ ≤ 11 . Combining (10) with the just derived
inequalities we get upper bounds on the norms of v2,
‖v2‖1 ≤
1
∞
− h
1
and ‖v2‖∞ ≤
1
1
. (11)
Furthermore v2 is defined as the solution of
AT
∞
v2 =
(
1
∞
− h
1
)
1d−h,1.
We note that all the entries of AT∞ are either 1 or −1, so that the inner product between
each row of AT and v2 is a lower bound on the l1-norm of v2. Since every entry of the r.h.s.
of the linear system is 1∞ − h1 we get ‖v2‖1 ≥ 1∞ − h1 , which combined with (11) leads to
‖v2‖1 = 1∞ − h1 .
This implies that AT∞ v2 = ‖v2‖1. In order to achieve equality 〈u, v〉 = ‖v‖1 it has
to hold ui = sgn(vi) for every vi 6= 0. If at least two components of v were non-zero, the
corresponding columns of AT would be identical, which contradicts the fact that AT has full
rank. Thus v2 can only have one non-zero component which in absolute value is equal to
1
∞
− h1 Thus, after a potential reordering of the components, v has the form
v =
 11 , . . . , 11︸ ︷︷ ︸
h times
,
1
∞
− h
1
, 0, . . . , 0
 .
From the second condition in (11), we have 1∞ − h1 ≤ 11 and h+ 1 ≥ 1∞ = k+α. Recalling
h ≤ k, we have
h ∈ [k + α− 1, k] ∩ N.
This means that, in order for S to define a face of C, we need h = k if α > 0, h ∈ {k − 1, k}
if α = 0 (in this case choosing h = k − 1 or h = k leads to the same v, so in practice it is
possible to use simply h = k for any α).
Once we have determined v, we can use again (8) and (9) to see that
‖b‖p ≥
1
‖v‖q
= 1(
k
q1
+
( 1
∞
− k1
)q) 1q = 1(1/∞ − α+ αq)1/q . (12)
Finally, for any v there exists b∗ ∈ pi for which equality is achieved in (12). Suppose that this
b∗ does not lie in a face of C. Then one could just consider the line segment from the origin
to b∗ and the point intersecting the boundary of C would have smaller lp-norm contradicting
the just derived inequality. Thus the b∗ realizing equality in (12) lies in a face of C. 
Note that our expression in Theorem 3.1 is exact and not just a lower bound. Moreover, the
minimal lp-distance on Rd \ C to the origin in Equation (7) is independent of the dimension
d, in constrast to the expression for the union of Rd \ (B1 ∪B∞) in (6) and the naive bound
in (5) which are both decreasing with d for p > 1. The condition 1 ∈ (∞, d∞) is required
so that none of the balls is a subset of the other one (see Proposition 3.1), in which case the
convex hull is simply one of the sets itself.
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Figure 2: Comparison of the minimal l2-norm on Rd \A, where A is the convex hull of B1 ∪B∞, see (7) (blue),
A = B1 ∪B∞, see (6)(red) and the naive lower bound (5) (green). We fix ∞ = 1 and show the results for d = 784
and d = 3072. We plot the value (or a lower bound in case of (5)) of the minimal ‖x‖2, depending on 1, given
by the different approaches (first and third plots). Moreover, we report (second and fourth plots) the ratios of the
minimal ‖x‖2 for Rd \ conv(B1 ∪ B∞) and Rd \ (B1 ∪ B∞).
Since we are going to focus on the l2-norm in the experiments in Section 5, we restrict here
the analysis to it. For p = 2 and α = 0, the minimal l2-norm over Rd \C, see (7), is given by√
1∞ compared to the minimal l2-norm over Rd \ U1,∞, see (6), given by
√
2∞ +
(1−∞)2
d−1 .
Their ratio is maximal when 1 =
√
d∞ and the maximal ratio is approximately d
1
4√
2 . Thus
the advantage of the guarantee wrt the convex hull of the union compared to the union
increases with the dimension of the input space. In Figure 1 we compare visually the l2-balls
(in red) in either R2 (top row) or R3 (bottom row) obtained by considering the union U1,∞
(6), and the convex hull C.
In Figure 2 we provide a quantitative comparison in high dimensions. We plot the minimal
l2-norm over Rd \C, (7) (blue), and over Rd \U1,∞, (6)(red) and its naive bound (5) (green)
for p = 2, fixing ‖x‖∞ = ∞ = 1 and either d = 784 (left) or d = 3072 (right), as those are
the dimensions of the input spaces of MNIST and CIFAR-10 respectively. One sees clearly
that the blue line corresponding to (7) is significantly higher than the other two. In the
second and fourth plots of Figure 2 we show, for each ‖x‖1 ≡ 1 ∈ [1, d], the ratio of the
l2-distance from (7) and the maximum between those of (5) and (6). The maximal ratio is
attained for 1 =
√
d as determined above and the maximal value is 3.81 for d = 784 and
5.31 for d = 3072.
4 Universal provable robustness with respect to all lp-norms
Combining the results of Theorems 2.1 and 3.1, the next result shows how to compute lower
bounds on the robustness of a continuous piecewise affine classifier f , e.g. a ReLU network,
at a point x wrt any lp-norm with p ≥ 1 using only dB1 (x), dD1 (x), dB∞(x) and dD∞(x).
Theorem 4.1 Let dBp (x), dDp (x) be defined as in (3) and define ρ1 = min{dB1 (x), |dD1 (x)|}
and ρ∞ = min{dB∞(x), |dD∞(x)|}. Let d ≥ 2 and x be correctly classified then, for any
p ∈ (1,∞),
rp(x) ≥ ρ1
(ρ1/ρ∞ − α+ αq)1/q
, (13)
with α = ρ1ρ∞ − b
ρ1
ρ∞
c and 1p + 1q = 1.
Proof. From the definition of dBp (x) and dDp (x) we know that none of the hyperplanes {pij}j
(either boundaries of the polytope Q(x) or decision hyperplanes) identified by V (l) and v(l),
l = 1, . . . , L + 1, is closer than min{dBp (x), |dDp (x)|} in lp-distance. Therefore the interior
of the l1-ball of radius ρ1 (namely, B1(x, ρ1)) and of the l∞-ball of radius ρ∞ (B∞(x, ρ∞))
centered in x does not intersect with any of those hyperplanes. This implies that {pij}j are
intersecting the closure of Rd \ conv(B1(x, ρ1) ∪B∞(x, ρ∞)). Then, from Theorem 3.1 we
get
min{dBp (x), |dDp (x)|} ≥
ρ1
(ρ1/ρ∞ − α+ αq)1/q
.
Finally, exploiting Theorem 2.1, rp(x) ≥ min{dBp (x), |dDp (x)|} holds. 
8
Note that, since any conv(B1(x, ρ′1) ∪ B∞(x, ρ′∞)) with ρ′1 ≥ ρ1 and ρ′∞ ≥ ρ∞ contains
conv(B1(x, ρ1) ∪ B∞(x, ρ∞)), increasing ρ1 and ρ∞ improves the lower bound on the ro-
bustness rp(x). This motivates the introduction of a new regularization scheme which
maximizes the corresponding linear regions wrt l1- and l∞-distance to the decision and region
boundaries aiming at training models which are provably robust wrt all the lp-norms with
p ≥ 1 simultaneously.
In [6] a regularization term is added to the training objective in order to enlarge the values
of dBp (x) and dDp (x), with x being the training points (note that they optimize dDp (x) and
not |dDp (x)| in order to encourage also correct classification). Let
dBp,l,j(x) =
∣∣ 〈V (l)j , x〉+ v(l)j ∣∣∥∥∥V (l)j ∥∥∥
q
, l = 1, . . . , L, j = 1, . . . , nL (14)
dDp,s(x) =
〈
V
(L+1)
c − V (L+1)s , x
〉
+ v(L+1)c − v(L+1)s∥∥∥V (L+1)c − V (L+1)s ∥∥∥
q
, s = 1, . . . ,K, s 6= c. (15)
Then they sort dBp,l,j (in total there are N hyperplanes, where N denotes the number of
hidden neurons) and dDp,s (there are K − 1 decision hyperplanes) both in increasing order
and denote them as dB
p,piB
i
and dD
p,piD
i
respectively. Then the Maximum Margin Regularizer,
MMR in short, of [6], can be written as
MMR-lp(x) =
1
kB
kB∑
i=1
max
(
0, 1−
dB
p,piB
i
(x)
γB
)
+ 1
kD
kD∑
i=1
max
(
0, 1−
dD
p,piD
i
(x)
γD
)
, (16)
and tries to push the kB closest hyperplanes defining Q(x) farther than γB from x and the
kD closest decision hyperplanes farther than γD from x both wrt lp-metric. In [6] guarantees
wrt a fixed lp-norm are considered, possibly in combination with adversarial training of [22].
This leads to classifiers which are empirically resistant wrt a fixed lp-adversarial attacks
and are easily verifiable by state-of-the-art methods to provide lower bounds on the true
robustness, e.g. [34, 31].
However, for our goal of simultaneous lp-robustness guarantees for all p ≥ 1, we use the
insights obtained from Theorem 4.1. Thus we propose to use a combination of MMR-l1
and MMR-l∞ to enhance implicitly robustness wrt every lp-norm without actually com-
puting and modifying separately all the distances dBp (x) and dDp (x) for the different values of p.
Definition 4.1 (MMR-Universal) Let x be a training point. We define the regularizer
MMR-Universal(x) = λ1
kB
kB∑
i=1
max
(
0, 1−
dB1,piB1,i
(x)
γ1
)
+ max
(
0, 1−
dB∞,piB∞,i
(x)
γ∞
)
+ λ∞
K − 1
K−1∑
i=1
max
(
0, 1−
dD1,piD1,i
(x)
γ1
)
+ max
(
0, 1−
dD∞,piD∞,i
(x)
γ∞
) (17)
where kB ∈ {1, . . . , N}, λ1, λ∞, γ1, γ∞ > 0 and K is the number of classes.
The loss function which is minimized during training of the classifier f is then
L
({(xi, yi)}Ti=1) = 1T
T∑
i=1
CE(f(xi), yi) + MMR-Universal(xi),
where {(xi, yi)}Ti=1 is the training set and CE indicates the cross-entropy loss.
During the optimization our regularizer aims at pushing both the polytope boundaries and
the decision hyperplanes farther than γ1 in l1-distance and farther than γ∞ in l∞-distance
from the training point x, in order to achieve robustness close or better than γ1 respectively
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γ∞. Note that if the projection of x on the decision hyperplane does not lie inside Q(x),
dDp (x) is just an approximation of the signed distance to the true decision surface, in which
case [6] argue that it is an approximation of the local Cross-Lipschitz constant which is
also associated to robustness [14]. The regularization parameters λ1 and λ∞ are used to
balance the weight of the l1- and l∞-term in the regularizer together with the cross-entropy
loss CE. Note that the terms of MMR-Universal involving the terms dD
p,piD
p,i
(x) penalize
misclassification, as they take negative values in this case.
Moreover, we take into account the kB closest hyperplanes and not just the closest one as
done in Theorems 2.1 and 4.1. This has two reasons: first, in this way the regularizer enlarges
the size of the linear regions around the training points more quickly and effectively, given
the large number of hyperplanes defining each polytope. Second, pushing many hyperplanes
influences also the neighboring linear regions of Q(x). This comes into play when, in order
to get better bounds on the robustness at x, one wants to explore also a portion of the
input space outside the linear region Q(x), which is where Theorem 4.1 holds. As noted in
[26, 6, 37], established methods to compute lower bounds on the robustness [34] are loose
or completely fail [31] when using normally trained models. In fact, their effectiveness is
mostly related to how many ReLU units have stable sign perturbing the input x within
a given lp-ball. This is almost equivalent to having the hyperplanes far from x, which is
what MMR-Universal tries to accomplish. This explains why in Section 5 we are able to use
successfully the methods of [34] and [31] to provably verify the robustness of the classifiers
trained with MMR-Universal.
5 Experiments
We compare the model obtained via our MMR-Universal regularizer1 to state-of-the-art
methods for provable robustness and adversarial training. As evaluation criterion we use the
robust test error, defined as the largest classification error when every image of the test set
can be perturbed within an lp-ball of radius p. In particular we focus on p ∈ {1, 2,∞} as
these are the most often used norms and thus enable a better comparison. Since computing
the robust test error is in general an NP-hard problem, we evaluate lower and upper bounds
on it. The lower bounds are obtained by the fraction of points for which an attack can
generate successful adversarial example in the lp-ball of radius p. For this task we use the
PGD-attack [21, 22, 32] (for l1, l2 and l∞), MIP [31] (for l∞) and the Linear Region Attack
[8] (for l2). The upper bounds are obtained by the fraction of test points for which we
cannot certify that no lp-perturbation smaller than p can change the correct class of the
original point. Such certificates are provided by [31] and [34]. Note that [34] generalizes to
any lp-norm with p ≥ 1, so that one can easily verify the models wrt any lp-norm.
With the architecture of [6, 34] we train CNNs on four datasets: MNIST, Fashion-MNIST
[36], German Traffic Sign (GTS) [29] and CIFAR-10 [20]. We consider several training
schemes: plain training, the PGD-based adversarial training (AT) of [22] with respect to a
fixed lp-norm, robust training (KW) of [34, 35], the MMR-regularized training (MMR) of
[6], either alone or combined with adversarial training (MMR+AT) and the training with
our regularizer MMR-Universal. Additionally, we use a combined adversarial training [32]
where we run independently PGD wrt the lp-norms for p ∈ {1, 2,∞} and take the point
realizing maximal loss corresponding to an attack wrt the union of the three lp-norm balls.
We use AT, KW, MMR and MMR+AT wrt both the l2- and l∞-norm, as these are the
norms for which these methods have been used and proven to be effective.
In Table 1 we report test error (TE), lower (LB) and upper (UB) bounds on the
robust test error for every dataset and training scheme, together with the thresholds
p used for each of them. Moreover we show the worst case UB, that is the maximum
across the UBs relative to each of the three norms considered, indicating that none of the
lp-perturbations can increase the robust test error above that value, so that lower is better.
While MMR-Universal does not deliver the best upper bound wrt the individual lp-norm for
p = 2 and p = ∞, it is the only method which can give non-trivival guarantees for all of
them, while most of the others have worst case UB close to 100%. For p = 1 it also yields
1https://github.com/fra31/mmr-universal
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Table 1: We report, for the different datasets and training schemes, the test error (TE) and lower (LB) and upper
(UB) bounds on the robust test error (in percentage) wrt the lp-norms at thresholds p, with p = 1, 2,∞ (that is the
largest test error possible if any perturbation of lp-norm equal to p is allowed), as well as the maximum of the UBs.
The training schemes compared are plain training, adversarial trainings of [22, 32] (AT), robust training of [34, 35]
(KW), MMR regularization of [6], MMR combined with AT (MMR+AT) and our MMR-Universal regularization.
One can clearly see that our MMR-Universal models are the only ones which have non trivial upper bounds on the
robust test error wrt all the considered norms.
provable robustness against multiple perturbations
l1 l2 l∞ worst
model TE LB UB LB UB LB UB case UB
MNIST 1 = 1 2 = 0.3 ∞ = 0.1
plain 0.85 2.2 100 3.0 100 73.9 100 100
AT-l∞ 0.82 1.7 100 1.6 100 3.0 100 100
AT-l2 0.87 1.8 100 2.1 100 19.3 100 100
AT-(l1, l2, l∞) 0.96 2.2 100 1.9 100 5.8 100 100
KW-l∞ 1.21 2.6 100 2.8 100 4.4 4.4 100
KW-l2 1.11 2.1 100 2.1 6.6 10.3 10.3 100
MMR-l∞ 1.65 6.4 100 4.7 100 6.0 6.0 100
MMR-l2 2.57 4.3 62.3 6.3 14.3 77.1 99.9 99.9
MMR+AT-l∞ 1.19 3.3 100 2.4 100 3.6 3.6 100
MMR+AT-l2 1.73 3.1 99.9 3.6 12.1 15.1 76.8 99.9
MMR-Universal 3.04 5.2 20.8 5.8 10.4 12.4 12.4 20.8
F-MNIST 1 = 1 2 = 0.3 ∞ = 0.1
plain 9.32 25.6 100 56.3 100 96.0 100 100
AT-l∞ 11.54 19.0 100 16.2 100 21.5 73.0 100
AT-l2 8.10 15.4 100 19.8 100 91.9 100 100
AT-(l1, l2, l∞) 15.11 22.4 100 19.7 100 28.9 100 100
KW-l∞ 21.73 34.2 100 29.2 99.2 32.4 32.4 100
KW-l2 13.08 15.8 19.8 15.6 19.9 66.7 86.8 86.8
MMR-l∞ 14.51 26.7 100 22.2 100 33.2 33.6 100
MMR-l2 12.85 18.2 39.4 23.7 33.2 94.8 100 100
MMR+AT-l∞ 14.52 24.3 100 21.7 100 26.6 30.7 100
MMR+AT-l2 13.40 17.2 55.4 19.5 37.8 64.4 99.1 99.1
MMR-Universal 18.57 25.0 52.4 23.9 37.4 43.5 44.3 52.4
GTS 1 = 3 2 = 0.2 ∞ = 4/255
plain 6.77 26.0 100 34.5 99.3 63.8 98.4 100
AT-l∞ 6.83 60.3 100 23.0 99.2 30.2 82.3 100
AT-l2 8.76 35.9 100 26.4 98.4 55.3 97.1 100
AT-(l1, l2, l∞) 8.80 39.3 100 22.2 93.7 38.4 79.4 100
KW-l∞ 15.57 84.0 100 38.9 77.7 36.1 36.6 100
KW-l2 14.35 42.6 100 29.6 35.3 56.4 63.0 100
MMR-l∞ 13.32 60.5 99.6 39.9 41.7 49.5 49.6 99.6
MMR-l2 14.21 51.2 80.4 34.8 36.6 61.3 63.6 80.4
MMR+AT-l∞ 14.89 81.9 100 37.3 44.7 38.3 38.4 100
MMR+AT-l2 15.34 45.2 84.3 31.9 33.8 55.4 60.2 84.3
MMR-Universal 15.98 47.8 51.5 32.2 34.6 47.0 47.0 51.5
CIFAR-10 1 = 2 2 = 0.1 ∞ = 2/255
plain 23.29 61.0 100 48.9 100 87.8 100 100
AT-l∞ 27.06 39.6 100 32.2 99.2 52.5 88.5 100
AT-l2 25.84 41.9 100 34.4 99.9 58.8 99.4 100
AT-(l1, l2, l∞) 35.41 46.6 100 41.2 88.2 55.3 76.8 100
KW-l∞ 38.91 51.9 100 39.6 66.1 46.6 48.0 100
KW-l2 40.24 46.0 100 43.5 49.3 53.6 54.7 100
MMR-l∞ 34.61 53.5 100 41.4 68.4 57.5 61.0 100
MMR-l2 40.93 57.4 98.0 49.0 56.3 70.6 86.1 98.0
MMR+AT-l∞ 35.38 50.6 100 40.0 84.7 47.9 54.2 100
MMR+AT-l2 37.78 48.4 99.9 44.6 54.2 59.6 74.1 99.9
MMR-Universal 46.96 54.7 63.4 50.9 53.6 63.8 63.8 63.8
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the best robustness guarantees with the exception of F-MNIST. The test error is slightly
increased wrt the other methods given provable robustness but the same holds true for
combined adversarial training AT-(l1, l2, l∞) compared to standard adv. training AT-l2/l∞.
Moreover, MMR-Universal provides upper bounds wrt the l2-norm, for which there is
no explicit regularization during training (see (17)), which are always comparable and
sometimes better than those achieved with procedure aiming specifically at l2-robustness.
Notably, on GTS, the l∞-UB of MMR-Universal model is smaller than the l∞-LB of
MMR-l∞, and the l2-UB of MMR-Universal model is smaller than the l2-LB of MMR-l2,
meaning that in this case the joint training is more beneficial than the single one even just
considering one of the metrics.
5.1 Experimental details
The convolutional architecture that we use is identical to [34], which consists of two convolu-
tional layers with 16 and 32 filters of size 4× 4 and stride 2, followed by a fully connected
layer with 100 hidden units. The KW, MMR and MMR+AT training models are those
presented in [6] and available2. For all experiments with MMR-Universal we use batch size
128 and we train the models for 100 epochs. Moreover, we use Adam optimizer [19] with
learning rate of 5× 10−4 for MNIST and F-MNIST, 0.001 for the other datasets. We also
reduce the learning rate by a factor of 10 for the last 10 epochs. On CIFAR-10 dataset we
apply random crops and random mirroring of the images as data augmentation.
For training we use MMR-Universal as in (17) with kB linearly (wrt the epoch) decreasing
from 20% to 5% of the total number of hidden units of the network architecture. We also
use a training schedule for λp where we linearly increase it from λp/10 to λp during the first
10 epochs. We employ both schemes since they increase the stability of training with MMR.
In order to determine the best set of hyperparameters λ1, λ∞, γ1, and γ∞ of MMR, we
perform a grid search over them for every dataset. In particular, we empirically found that
the optimal values of γp are usually between 1 and 2 times the p used for the evaluation of
the robust test error, while the values of λp are more diverse across the different datasets.
Specifically, for the models we reported in Table 1 the following values for the (λ1, λ∞) have
been used: (3.0, 12.0) for MNIST, (3.0, 40.0) for F-MNIST, (3.0, 12.0) for GTS and (1.0,
6.0) for CIFAR-10.
In Table 1, while the test error which is computed on the full test set, the statistics regarding
upper and lower bounds on the robust test error are computed on the first 1000 points of
the respective test sets. For MIP [31] we use a timeout of 120s, that means if no guarantee
is obtained by that time, the algorithm stops verifying that point.
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